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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether plaintiffs, former public employees who were
disqualified from participation in the Utah State Retirement
System when their public employer was sold to a private
corporation, may recover the pension fund contributions previously
paid on their behalf by their public employer.
2.

Whether the termination and forfeiture provisions of

the Utah State Retirement Act, particularly Utah Code Ann,
S 49-10-24, strictly limit plaintiffs1 rights against the Utah
State Retirement System and preclude an equitable action for
restitution of their employer contributions.

STATUTE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
Utah Code Ann, §49-10-24?
Options of terminating employee — Withdrawal of
accumulated contributions — Inactive membership. If a member
shall for any cause, except retirement, permanent or temporary
disability or death, cease to be employed in covered services
for an employer he may:
(a) By written request directed to the
retirement office receive a refund of all his accumulated
contributions, less a withdrawal fee the amount of which
the retirement board shall establish by regulation for
the purpose of reimbursing its administrative fund for
the cost entailed by said withdrawal. In the event of
such election, a terminating employee upon later
re-employemnt by an employer under the provisions of this
act, unless he redeposits his refund as herein permitted,
shall be treated as a new employee and his service
history and benefit rights shall then be based upon
current services from the date of said re-employment in
covered services.

-1-
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(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In
the event of such election, a terminating employee shall
retain status as a member of the system, excepting for
the lack of contributions paid into the fund by him or on
his behalf. In the event of his re-employment by an
employer for services covered by this act, his service
history and benefit rights shall be based upon the prior
service credit and current service credit accredited to
him at the time of his most recent termination of
employment, as well as upon the current service credit
that he acquires as the result of his re-employment.
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an inactive
member shall have the same rights to receive retirement
benefits, if eligible therefor, as any active employee member.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an order of Judge James S. Sawaya of
the Third Judicial District Court denying plaintiffs1 motion for
parital summary judgment and granting defendant's oral cross
motion for summary judgment, no cause of action. PlaintiffsAppellants1 motion sought a declaration that Utah Code Ann.
§49-10-24 is inapplicable to plaintiffs as a matter of law, and an
order that the defendant Utah State Retirement Office return to
plaintiffs the employer contributions paid on their behalf by
their former employer.
Plaintiffs1 public employer, Payson City Hospital, was
sold to a private corporation, rendering the Hospital and
plaintiffs ineligible to continue participating in the Retirement
System.

Plaintiffs1 demand for restitution of their employer

contributions was denied by the Retirement Office because
defendant classified plaintiffs as "terminating employees" under
Utah Code Ann. §49-10-24. Plaintiffs contend that statute was
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Statement of Proceedings For Which No Transcript Was Made,
(Record at

; reproduced in Addendum.)

On February 8, 1985, the

district court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiffs1
motion (record at 357). Plaintiffs1 timely Notice of Appeal was
filed on March 8, 1985 (record at 365).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

PRELIMINARY FACTUAL STATEMENT
A.

The Statutory Framework of the Utah State
Retirement System.
The Utah State Retirement Act ("Act"), Utah Code Ann.

S 49-10-1 et. seq., was passed in 1967 to establish the
most recent version of a succession of public employee retirement
systems.

See e.g., Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-3. The Act

is administered by the Utah State Retirement Board through the
respondent Utah State Retirement Office. Utah Code Ann.
S 49-10-1.
The express purpose of the 1967 Act was to terminate and
consolidate the old school employees' and public employees1
retirement systems; to provide a uniform system of membership,
retirement requirements, and contributions and benefits for publi
employees and their employers; and to enable employees to provide
for themselves and their dependents in the case of old age,
disability and death.

Utah Code Ann. SS 49-10-2, 49-10-3.

All employing units participating in the terminated
systems, including Payson City Hospital, were automatically
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Although the Retirement Office provided assistance to the
Utah Legislature before passage of the 1967 Act, no mention was
made that an employer unit might withdraw from the Retirement
System.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 33:19 to 34:23.
Prior to passage of the current Act in 1967, no employing

unit had ever withdrawn from the retirement system.

Deposition of

Burt Hunsaker at 33:10-13.
The only withdrawals that occurred between 1967 and 1983
involved (1) a few small cities with a couple of employees who
changed to ineligible part-time or elected positions, and (2) two
or three small cities' hospitals, such as Payson City Hospital,
that were sold around 1977. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 32:8
to 33:9.
Prior to 1983, the Act made no provision for employer
unit withdrawals.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 66:13-18;

Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-11 (amended 1983, 1984).

See also

City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Office, Civ. No.
C82-6157, Memorandum Decision at 5 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah Jan.
17, 1983) (record at 211).I7

hJ City of West Jordan involved the city's
attempt to withdraw while it was still a political subdivision.
The court held that the city could not withdraw because the Act
made no provision for withdrawal. In the present case, however,
defendant admits that Payson City Hospital did in fact withdraw as
a result of its divestiture to a private entity. Deposition of
Burt Hunsaker at 32:20-22. See also footnote 4, infra.
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wmpluyeH

contributions and the Hospital paid its required matching
contributions.
On or about October 1, 1977, Payson City sold the
Hospital to a private entity.

The decision to sell was made by

Payson City and not by the plaintiffs.

The sale was made with the

approval of the Utah Department of State Planning.
Upon the sale, plaintiffs were not fired, nor did they
quit, change jobs, or otherwise cease to be employed by the
Hospital.
Because of the sale of the Hospital, the Retirement
Office, through its Executive Director, Mr. Burt Hunsaker, was
obliged to interpret the Act to determine the status of the
appellants.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 54:24 to 55:4.

Mr. Hunsaker looked to the Act, particularly § 49-10-24,
which sets forth the options of a "terminating" employee.
Deposition of Bert Hunsaker at 54:5-15 and 56:17 to 57:4. That
statute provides that a member who, except for retirement,
disability or death ceases to be employed in "covered services"
may:

(1) withdraw his accumulated employee contributions, or (2)

leave his account in the Fund intact and receive deferred
retirement benefits based on service to date when he reaches
retirement age. Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-24.
Mr. Hunsaker determined that the Act did not distinguish
between individual terminations of employees and the departure of
an entire employer unit. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 55:5-10.
That interpretation was based on Mr. Hunsaker1s underlying
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interpretation that there was no provision in the Act for an
employing unit's withdrawal,

Ld. at 66:13-18. Thus, Mr.

Hunsaker determined that plaintiffs were limited to the options in
S 49-10-24, even though they continued to perform their same jobs
for the same hospital.
After the Retirement Office determined that Utah
Code Ann. § 49-10-24 governed plaintiffs' rights,
approximately 106 hospital employees with less than four years of
service were required to forfeit all retirement fund benefits
arising from employer contributions paid by the Hospital on their
behalf.

Another group of approximately 59 employees —

over four years of service —

those with

had to choose one of the two options

in S 49-10-24. Of the 59, about 43 chose the first option (a
refund of employee contributions), resulting in their forfeiture
of rights and benefits deriving from the Hospital's contributions
on their behalf; approximately 10 chose the second option and left
their employee contributions in the System; 6 chose early
retirement.
By the time the Hospital was sold, it had paid
substantial employer contributions on behalf of plaintiffs.
Determination of the amount of employer contributions was reserved
for trial in plaintiffs1 motion.
II.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The material facts relied upon by plaintiffs in their

motion for partial summary judgment are set forth below.

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Those

facts were not disputed by the defendant in its memorandum in
opposition or at the hearing,

(Statement of Proceedings In Which

No Transcript Was Made, record at

). The court below found no

genuine issue of material fact (record at 357).
1.

Payson City Hospital joined the public employees

retirement system in 1961 and automatically became a participating
employer in the current Utah State Retirement System when enacted
in 1967.
2.

As employees of a participating employer, plaintiffs

were required to become, and did become, members of the Utah State
Retirement System.
3.

Plaintiffs paid their required employee contributions

under the Retirement System to the defendant.
4.

The Hospital paid its mandatory matching employer

contributions on plaintiffs1 behalf to the defendant.
5.

In 1977, the Hospital was sold by Payson City to a

private entity, the Hospital Corporation of America.
6.

Upon the sale, plaintiffs continued in their former

jobs and did not quit, retire, change jobs, or otherwise cease
working for the Hospital.
7.

Plaintiffs took no part in Payson City's decision to

sell the Hospital.
8.

Plaintiffs sought a refund of their employer

contributions from the Retirement Office, arguing that the
termination and forfeiture provisions of the Act did not apply to
them as a class of involuntarily and suddenly disqualified
employees.
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9.

The Retirement Office determined that plaintiffs were

"terminating employees" under Utah Code Ann, § 49-10-24. The
Retirement Office interpreted § 49-10-24 to govern regardless of
whether plaintiffs were terminated as individuals or disqualified
as a class.
10.

Because plaintiffs were treated as "terminating

employees/1 approximately 106 employees with less than four years
of credited service received a refund of their employee
contributionsf but were required to forfeit all benefits under the
Utah State Retirement System, including employer contributions
paid on their behalf.
11.

Another group of approximately 59 employees had over

four years of service and had to choose one of the options under
S 49-10-24: about 43 chose the first option, withdrawing their
employee contributions and forfeiting all rights and benefits
derived from employer contributions paid on their behalf; about 10
chose the second option, leaving their employee contributions in
the Retirement Fund; and about 6 chose early retirement.
12.

Plaintiffs appealed the Utah State Retirement

Board's determination that S 49-10-24 governs plaintiffs' rights
to the Third District Court,
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought a
declaration that the termination provisions of the Actf including
S 49-10-24, do not apply to plaintiffs and sought restitution of
the employer contributions paid on their behalf by Payson City
Hospital to the Utah State Retirement Fund,

The motion reserved

determination of the amount of recovery for trial. On all legal
issues, the analysis in support of plaintiffs' motion is the same
as the analysis in opposition to defendant's motion.
This Court's decisions, acts of the Utah Legislature, and
basic labor economics establish that plaintiffs' employer
contributions are part of their employment compensation in the
form of "deferred wages." Plaintiffs have a legally protectable
interest in their employer contributions (deferred wages), even
before attaining vested benefits.
Plaintiffs' rights to enjoy their deferred wages would
normally be predicated on satisfying the statutory vesting
schedule.

However, cases such as this one have shown that events

outside the contemplation of the retirement plan may frustrate or
render impossible satisfying those vesting requirements.

The best

reasoned decisions from courts faced with this problem hold that
employee groups suffering unanticipated mass discharge have an
immediate equitable claim for restitution of their deferred
wages.

This restitution is necessary to prevent an unjustified

windfall to the retirement system caused by employee forfeitures
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that were beyond the plan's actuarial assumptions and outside the
scope of the participants' assumed risks.
Before this case arose, the Utah State Retirement System
never contemplated the divestitute of a participating employer
unit and the consequent mass disqualification of an entire
workforce.

There was no historical experience in Utah to prompt

legislature consideration of this problem and, in fact, no
legislative discussion of this phenomenon is known to have
occurred.
The Retirement Office's application of the Act's
termination provisions to plaintiffs, disqualified from
participation in the Retirement System for reasons beyond their
control, worked a gross and inequitable forfeiture to the unjust
enrichment of the Retirement System.

As a matter of law,

therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of the employer
contributions paid on their behalf.

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS' EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS WERE COMPENSATION FOR
PLAINTIFFS' SERVICES IN THE FORM OF "DEFERRED WAGES." "
Pension plans were originally perceived as gratuitous,
bestowing no enforceable rights on participating employees or
retirees.

See generally, Bernstein, Employee Pension

Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952, 959 (1963)
(record at 222). Utah, however, long ago joined the modern view
that "the right to a pension becomes as much a part of the agreed
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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compensation for the services of the employee as the monthly
stipend, but it is deferred in payment until after his
retirement."

Newcombe v. Ogden City Public School Teachers

Retirement Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 943 (1952).
The theory for viewing employer pension contributions as
"deferred wages" is well-founded:
Unions demand increases of X cents per hour in money wages and
Y cents per hour in fringe benefits, including pension plan
contributions. Employers respond with counteroffers [and]
. . . [factfinding boards report bargaining proposals of both
in the same fashion. The bargaining of large unions and large
employers is most explicit on this point because both sides
have the technical assistance to translate fringe costs,
including pension plan contributions, into costs per
hour . . . .
Not infrequently ununionized
pattern set by the unionized
for employees . . . . [Ajs a
plans seem no less a part of
bargained plans . . . .

employers are "following" the
sector as a means of competing
general proposition, unbargained
employee compensation than

The demand to bargain did not turn the contributions and
pension plan into "wages"; rather, it was the nature of the
inducement by the company to the employees and the value of
the contributions and the benefits to the employees which
made them "wages".
Bernstein, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 960, 961 (emphasis added).
Under Utah's Retirement System the proportion of
contributions paid by employees and employers is the subject of
negotiation at the legislative level. For example, participating
public employers contribute more than employees in the Public
Safety Retirement System, the Firemen Retirement System, and the
Judges Retirement System; but employer and employee contributions
are equal in the public employees1 Utah State Retirement System.
Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 43, 44. The basis for the
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discrepancy between the retirement funds is "[negotiation by the
individual groups when establishing a program.

The law being an

effort at the legislature, a compromise between employer and
employees."

Id. The fact that the various funds' proportions

of employer to employee contribution rates is subject to
negotiation confirms the fact that all contributions are truly
part of an employee's total compensation.
The fact that pension contributions are deferred wages is
further manifested by the State Department of Personnel's biennial
comparisons of state and private compensation for similar jobs.
Utah Code Ann. S 67-19-12.
categories:

Included in the studies are three

take-home pay, fringe benefits including pension

values, and a composite of money and fringe benefits. Although
take-home wages for some positions differ between the public and
private sectors, it is the composite figure which the Legislature
attempts to equalize.

Section 67-19-12(3) defines "total

compensation" for purposes of the salary survey to "include but
not be limited to salaries and wages, bonuses . . . retirement
and all other fringe benefits that are or may be offered to
state employees as inducements to work for the state."
(Emphasis added).

See also Utah Code Ann.

S 67-19-12(2)(f).
The deferred compensation characteristic of employer
contributions is conclusively demonstrated by the history of
Utah's retirement system.

In 1951, the Utah Legislature voted to

repeal the State retirement system in order to join the Social
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Security System.

Provision was made for employees with less than

ten years service to receive back the present value of both
their employee and employer contributions in the form of a
paid-up annuity.

Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement

System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 53, 57, 246 P.2d
591, 595, 597 (1952) (record at 252).
The Utah Legislature has historically viewed employer and
employee retirement contributions as equally compensatory in
nature and intent.

See also Driggs v. Utah State Teachers

Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 657 (1943) (refusing
to distinguish between pension benefits funded solely by the
employee, and benefits funded by the state, or both the state and
employee).

It is clear, therefore, that plaintiffs' employer

contributions were compensation in the form of deferred wages.
Plaintiffs have legally enforcible interests in their deferred
wages, even if plaintiffs' pension rights are not "vested."
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A PROTECTABLE INTEREST IN THEIR
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.
Members of the Retirement System have "inchoate
contractual rights, which upon completion of conditions precedent
to retirement and actual retirement, ripen into vested rights."
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417,
434, 142 P.2d 657, 664 (1943). Because the sale of Payson City
Hospital to a private corporation disqualified plaintiffs from
continued public service, they could not complete those conditions
precedent to formal "vesting."
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Nevertheless, the rights of public employees to
protection of their inchoate interests in employer contributions,
even those which are not "vested," have long been recognized.

For

example, constitutional law forbids altering the requirements for
attaining vested benefits after an employee has begun
participation in the pension plan.

See, e.g., Public

Employees Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 615 P.2d 972, 974
(Nev. 1980); discussion in Singer v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan.
356, 607 P.2d 467, 473-75 (1980).
Professor Corbin recognizes that
It is clear that the fact that rights are future and
conditional does not prevent their recognition and
protection; they are within the protection of the
constitutional provision against impairment of obligations by
a State.
3A Corbin on Contracts § 626, at 10 (1960) (emphasis added)
(record at 267). See also State v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844
(Alaska 1981).
The principle that "nonvested" employees have protectable
rights was demonstrated in Hansen v. Public Employees
Retirement System Board of Administrators, 122 Utah 44, 53,
57, 246 P.2d 591, 595, 597 (1952).

In Hansen, a public

employee without vested pension benefits sought to invalidate the
Legislature's repeal of the retirement system for the purpose of
joining the Federal Social Security System.

The court denied his

claim, but primarily because he was provided with a "substantial
substitute" for his right to continued participation in the
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repealed system.

The "substantial substitute" took the form of a

paid-up annuity equal to his employee and employer contributions.
Hansen is very analogous to the instant case. First,
the facts in Hansen involved the repeal of the entire
retirement system.

Similarly, the facts at bar present the

dismantling of an entire subset (an employer unit) of the current
Retirement System.

Second, the "substantial substitute" in

Hansen is exactly the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the
instant case:

return of employer as well as employee

contributions.
Therefore, plaintiffs have a protectable interest in
their deferred wages. The next issue is what form that protection
should take when an unanticipated mass disqualification of an
entire workforce makes attaining vested benefits impossible.
III.

FAILURE OF THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT TO CONTEMPLATE
THE MASS DISQUALIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS GIVES PLAINTIFFS
A RIGHT TO RESTITUTION OF THEIR EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.
Courts have long held that the intended scope of a

pension plan's forfeiture provisions determines whether terminated
employees have a claim for restitution.

Most critically, those

courts have often recognized that express forfeiture provisions,
which initially appear to limit employees1 rights, were not
actually drafted in contemplation of operations foreclosures and
mass terminations.

Consequently, those courts have upheld the

rights of terminated employee classes to restitution.
The first award of restitution to a class of discharged
employees came in Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill, 287
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N.Y.S. 281 (1936) (record at 269)•

Employees of a closed down

mill sued the association which represented the employees of three
companies and which provided sick benefits to its members. The
association defended itself on the grounds of a by-law which
declared forfeited any money paid to the association by a
terminated employee.

The court held that the section was

intended simply to cover the case of individual members who
left the employ of the companies either voluntarily or
involuntarily while such company continued in production and
in the employment of help. In the case at bar a substantial
number of members of the defendant association have lost
employment en masse for reasons beyond their control
through the discontinuance of operations of the [employer]
. . . [Wjhen the defendant association came into being
it was not within the contemplation of the members . . .
that the mass discharge of all employees through the
closing down and taking out of production of the mill . . . ..
was such leaving of employment as described in Section 5.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Longhine court

awarded the plaintiffs their prorated share of the association's
assets.
In Lucas v. Seagrave Corporation, 277 F. Supp. 338
(D. Minn. 1967) (record at 275)r the new owner of the employing
corporation discharged 30 of the 65 participating employees and
deemed the terminated employees' rights forfeited.

Consequently,

the employees claimed that they had been discharged as a group to
Seagrave's unjust enrichment.
The court denied the defendant employer's motion for
summary judgment and found that it had been unjustly enriched by
plaintiffs' forfeitures.

Seagrave had retained prior tax

advantages from plaintiffs' participation and had been able to
refrain from paying plaintiffs their full compensation in cash.
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"It seems unrealistic to say in this context, as some courts have,
that the employer received nothing."

_ld. at 345. Rigid

adherence to the pension plan's language was deemed inequitable
because it did not consider whether the plan intended to place the
risk of circumstances not contemplated in the actuarial
assumptions on the employees.

In reaching its conclusion, the

Lucas court placed great reliance on Bernstein, Employee
Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952
(1963).
This Court should adopt the position taken by the
Illinois Court of Appeals in Kenneke v. First National Bank of
Chicago, 105 111. App.3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982) (record at
283); see also prior appeal, 65 111. App.3d 10, 382 N.E.2d 309
(1978) (record at 294). In Kenneke, the plaintiffs were
delivery drivers for one publisher and were covered by a
multiple-employer pension plan.

The plaintiffs1 employer ceased

publishing, dismissed all its drivers, and told them that they had
not yet acquired any vested benefits.
The trial court had awarded summary judgment to the
plan's defendant trustee based on provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement and pension plan.l'

The appellate

i/ Section 11.2 of the plan provided:
"Vested Interests. Neither the association, any Employer,
Participant, nor the Union, nor any member of the Union, . . .
shall have any right, title or interest in or to the Pension
Trust Fund, or any part thereof, excepting the right of a
Participant to benefits as provided hereunder."
-20-
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court reversed, stating that the plan provisions themselves did
not "operate to place the full risk of lost pension benefits from
mass termination on the employees."

434 N.E.2d at 499. Rather

the intention of the parties had to be ascertained.

The thrust of

the opinion is that, absent a showing by the employer that the
risk of mass termination had been clearly allocated to the
employees, a suit for unjust enrichment would succeed.

Both of

the Kenneke opinions relied on the Bernstein article, and the
Lucas opinion.

434 N.E.2d at 498; 382 N.E.2d at 311.

The need to protect the inchoate rights of employees to
their deferred wages (employer contributions) has also been
recognized by Congress, and efforts to provide such protection
were recently codified in the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA").

In order to attain the tax benefits under ERISA, a

pension plan must contain a "partial termination" clause, whereby
all contributions made on behalf of a group of employees
terminated en masse become nonforfeitable.

See 26 U.S.C.

S 411(d)(3) (record at 297). The policy of S 411(d)(3), described
in United Steelworkers of America v. Harris & Sons Steel Co.,
706 F.2d 1289, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1983) (record at 299), is to
ensure that "employees will not be deprived of their anticipated
benefits."

Citing Xucas, supra, the Third Circuit stated

that pension plans which do not actuarially anticipate the sudden
discharge of a large group of employees may incur a windfall. 706
F.2d 1298 n. 23. Obviously, the State plan in the present case is
not governed by ERISA.

Nevertheless, the policy behind § 411
-21-
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clearly supports the equitable nature of plaintiffs1 claim for
restitution.
Finally, the most basic principles of contract law
support plaintiffs1 claim for equitable relief.

Both the

Lucas opinion, supra, and the Bernstein thesis rely in
part on Sections 357(1) and 468(1) of the Restatement [First] of
Contracts (1932) (record at 317). Section 357 states that when a
plaintiff has not willfully failed to completely perform a
condition of his contract,1^ "the plaintiff can get
judgment for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm he
has caused to the defendant."
Section 468(1) provides that "[e]xcept where a contract
clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has rendered part
performance for which there is no defined return fixed by
contract, and who is discharged from further performance by
impossibility of rendering it, can get judgment for the value of
past performance rendered."

1'
The relationship of the parties under the
Utah State Retirement Act is contractual as well as statutory.
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417,
422, 434, 142 P.2d 657, 659, 664 (1943); City "of West Jordan v.
Utah State Retirement Office, Civ. No. C82-6157, Memorandum
Decision, at 6 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah July 29, 1983) (record at
319). The defendant argued below that private pension cases such
as Lucas, Longhinee and Kenneke are irrelevant in an
action against a public pension fund. This Court, however,
specifically rejected that argument in Driggs. 105 Utah at
427-28, 142 P.2d at 661-62.

-22-
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In the present case, plaintiffs are unable to complete
the performance required to secure pension benefits due to the
sale of the Hospital; plaintiffs played no role in the decision to
sell the Hospital and their consequent disqualification.

Thus,

plaintiffs fall squarely within sections 357(1) and 468(1)•
The above case law, Congressional policy, and learned
treatises all support restitution of employer contributions for
employees disqualified en masse.

Consequently, upon

plaintiffs' conclusive showing in the next section that employer
withdrawal was not contemplated by the Utah State Retirement Act,
equitable recovery must be granted.
IV. THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE MASS
DISQUALIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS.
All of the circumstances surrounding the Act support only
one conclusion;

the 1967 Legislature did not contemplate the

possibility of withdrawal by an entire employer unit, or the
divestiture of a public employer unit to a private corporation.
At the hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment,
defendant admitted that the 1967 Legislature had never
expressly considered these possibilities. (Statement of
Proceedings In Which No Transcript Was Made, record at

).

The language of Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-24, which sets
forth the options of terminating employees, speaks only in terms
of individual employees. Nothing in the language suggests that
the Legislature considered the consequences of an entire work
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force barred from continued participation by the divestiture of
their employing unit.
The historical employee turnover rates prior to the 1967
Act came from a period of governmental growth, not contraction.
Unlike the private sector, the possibility of the closure or
divestment of an employer unit was simply not a serious
contingency requiring contemplation in 1967. The history of the
Retirement System supports this view —

prior to 1967, no

employing unit is known to have withdrawn from the Retirement
System.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 33:10-13. Employer

withdrawal only became an issue around 1977, when Payson City
Hospital and a couple of other public hospitals were divested.
The only other relevant history is the very few instances in which
small units have discontinued employment of the couple of persons
eligible for coverage.

Defendant has characterized those very few

instances in deposition as follows:
Q:

In your history with the various systems, have there ever
been occasions when . . . a unit itself has withdrawn
from the fund and thereby ceased to have coverage under
it?

A:

Only through having no employees. In other words, they
have no employees. They've had one or two employees;
they ceased to have any employees, so there's no
membership. . . . I'm referring to a small city that
might have an employee on full-time and they've gone to
part-time or elected positions where they haven't been
covered.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 32:8-19. Thus, prior to the Payson
City Hospital's divestiture, there was never any reason to
contemplate and provide for mass termination.
-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Even more compelling is Mr. Hunsakerfs testimony
regarding the Legislative process at the time of enactment:
Q:

. . . was it ever brought up [by the Retirement Office]
that an entire unit might withdraw from the system?

A:

In dealing with the legislature?

Q:

Yes.

A:

No.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 34:18-23. Even defendant's own
counsel's questions establish the absence of legislative
consideration:
Q.

. . . is there any provision in the law for withdrawing
of an employer unit?

A.

No, that's what created the problem.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 66:16-18.1/
Thus, the only known circumstances concerning the
legislative intent show that (1) there was no historical
experience to prompt legislative contemplation of mass

i 7 The new S 49-10-ll(3)-(4) forbids employer
withdrawal except as permitted by the Retirement Board and subject
to S 49-10-24. That section, however, became effective March 3,
1983. 1983 Utah Laws Ch. 224, SS 6, 12. Even the new
provision, however, does not appear to address undeniable de
facto withdrawal when a public entity is divested and its
employees become ineligible for continued participation.
Furthermore, the amendments to § 49-10-11 do not retroactively
affect appellants' action. Utah Code Ann. S 68-3-3.
Finally, the incorporation of S 49-10-24 by § 49-10-11(4)
is limited to employing units that began participation pursuant to
S 49-10-11(3). Payson City Hospital, however, was admitted
pursuant to S 49-10-3(h) and not S 49-10-11(3). Thus, the
legislature has still not provided for withdrawal under the
circumstances of this case.
-25-
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termination, (2) no known legislative discussion of the
possibility of mass termination was held, and (3) the statutory
language itself does not suggest any contemplation of mass
termination or employer withdrawal.

As cases such as Kenneke,

Lucas, and Longhine exemplify, failure to consider mass
termination is common, even in the private sector where such a
risk is much more pervasive.

Accord Bernstein, Employee

Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952
(1963)5/.
CONCLUSION:

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW

The employer contributions made by Payson City Hospital
were compensation for plaintiffs1 services in the form of deferred

±' Three justices of the United States Supreme
Court adopted the Bernstein article and found that "Pension plans
normally do not make provision to protect the interests of
employees . . . who are terminated because an employer closes one
of his plants. . . . For unlike discharges for inadequate job
performance, which may reasonably be foreseen, the closure of a
plant is a contingency outside the range of normal expectations of
both employer and employee." Allied Stuctural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 253 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall,
J.J., dissenting) (majority holding retroactive state minimum
funding law violated contract clause of U.S. Constitution) (record
at 337). Although these justices were speaking in dissent, the
issue and holding in Spannaus were quite distinct from the
case at bar.
See also Note, A Reappraisal of the Private
Pension System, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 278 (1972); Levin,
Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits,
15 Vill. L. Rev. 527 (1970); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights
of the Retired Worker, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 909 (1970); Note,
Employees1 Rights To"~Employer Contributed Pension Benefits
After A Plant Shutdown, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 807.
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wages; moreover, plaintiffs have protectable rights in those
employer contributions whether or not they attained "vested
benefits.ff

As a matter of law, where mass termination was not

contemplated at the time the forfeiture terms of a pension plan
were established, terminated employees are excused from the
vesting schedule and have a right to restitution for employer
contributions.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a reversal of the
district court's Order granting summary judgment to defendant, and
denying plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment. The
district court should be directed to enter an order

(1) that the

forefeiture provisions of the Act, including § 42-10-24, are not
applicable to the plaintiffs, (2) that the Utah State Retirement
Fund, administered by the defendant, has been unjustly enriched,
and (3) that plaintiffs are entitled to restitution.

The actual

amount of recovery is subject to subsequent determination at trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7</^v day of June, 1985.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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A-l

49-10-24. Options of terminating employee — Withdrawal of accumulated contributions — Inactive membership. If a member shall for
any cause, except retirement, permanent or temporary disability or death,
cease to be employed in covered services for an employer he may:
(a) By written request directed to the retirement office receive a refund
of all his accumulated contributions, less a withdrawal fee the amount of
which the retirement board shall establish by regulation for the purpose
of reimbursing its administrative fund for the cost entailed by said withdrawal. In the event of such election, a terminating employee upon later
re-employment by an employer under the provisions of this act, unless he
redeposits his refund as herein permitted, shall be treated as a new
employee and his service history and benefit rights shall then be based
upon current services from the date of said re-employment in covered services.
(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In the event of such election,
a terminating employee shall retain status as a member of the system,
excepting for the lack of contributions paid into the fund by him or on
his behalf. In the event of his re-employment by an employer for services
covered by this act, his service history and benefit rights shall be based
upon the prior service credit and current service credit accredited to him
at the time of his most recent termination of employment, as well as upon
the current service credit that he acquires as the result of his
re-employment.
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an inactive member shall have
the same rights to receive retirement benefits, if eligible therefor, as any
active employee member.
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A-2

Stanford B. Owen, A2495
jjAttorney for Plaintiffs
•Robert Palmer Rees
Law Clerk Appointed to Represent
!! Plaintiffs
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARK L. JOHNSON and CAROL ANN
NIELSON, on behalf of themselves
jand as representatives of all
others similarly situated,

STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
WHICH NO TRANSCRIPT WAS MADE

i

Civil No, C78-6162
(Hone James S. Sawaya)

Plaintiffs,
v.
'UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE, a
Utah State Agency,

1 I

Appeal No.

!i
j

!

?!
l!

Defendant.
Pursuant to Utah R. App. p. 11(g), Mark L. Johnson and

Carol Ann Nielson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants in the
::above-captioned matter submit the following statement of the
January 28, 1985 hearing, held without a court reporter, on the
it

parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
This statement is based upon the recollection of Stanford
B. Owen, counsel of record for the plaintiffs, and Robert Palmer
Rees, law clerk appointed by court order to represent the
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This statement is limited to matters raised at the

.hearing which are not otherwise sufficiently covered in the
Iparties1 memoranda of points and authorities submitted before the
^hearing.
il
1
j|
1.

• «.
The January 28, 1985 hearing was scheduled by

plaintiffs to consider plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary
judgment.

Plaintiffs were orally advised by defendant that a

cross-motion for summary judgment might be made orally at the
scheduled hearing.
;

2.

Before plaintiffs presented their oral argument,

il
counsel for the defendant made an oral cross-motion for summary
;i

|}

judgment.

Defendant's counsel stated that the cross-motion was

''appropriate because no material facts were in dispute.
.received defendant's motion.

The Court

•!

3.
1

Plaintiffs began their oral argument by observing

that defendant had indicated no material facts were in dispute

II

when making its oral motion; plaintiffs further noted that
^defendant's memorandum of points and authorities did not properly
raise any material factual issue.

Plaintiffs stated that they

would therefore not address any factual issues unless raised by
i !

the defendant in oral argument.
I:

4.

After summarizing the Preliminary Factual Statement

from plaintiffs' memorandum in support, plaintiffs made their
legal argument based on the four-part analysis presented in their
memorandum.
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5.

During their initial argument, plaintiffs withdrew

ft

ijtheir citation to Cal. Gov. Code §§ 20563, 20564 (West) (appended
Ito plaintiffs' memorandum as Appendix L) because that section does
not, as erroneously first read, refer to employer contributions.
ii

!!

6.

In defendant's oral argument, defendant admitted that

• i

the 1967 Utah Legislature had not expressly considered the
: I

prospect of an employer unit withdrawing from the Utah State
Retirement System, or the possibility of divestiture of a public
employer unit to a private corporation.

Defendant then proceeded

with the legal arguments presented in its memorandum in opposition.
j!
7. In rebuttal, plaintiffs clarified that they were not
'Iraising the constitutional arguments from their complaint in their
•Imotion for partial summary judgment.
ji

DATED this

P

day of

VlcL'iAsf-^^

, 1985.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation

BySl^^2^
§ta'irfbrd B. Owen
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Mark A. Madsen
Attorney for Defendant
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